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The Bangladesh Quota Reform Movement: Causes and Political Consequences

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Abstract

The 2024 Bangladesh Quota Reform Movement stands as one of the most consequential political upheavals in the nation's post-independence history. What began as a student-led protest demanding reform of a civil service quota system - which reserved 56% of government jobs for designated groups including descendants of 1971 Liberation War freedom fighters rapidly escalated into a nationwide uprising against authoritarianism. The state's violent crackdown claimed over 1,400 lives according to final tallies, wounded more than 20,000, and ultimately forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign and flee the country on 5 August 2024 after 15 continuous years in power. This article provides a comprehensive, evidence-based analysis of the historical origins of the quota system, the proximate triggers of the 2024 protests, the human rights violations documented by the United Nations and international organizations, the political and economic structural factors that transformed a job-quota grievance into a mass revolution, and the post-Hasina transition led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. The article draws on United Nations Human Rights Council reports, Amnesty International documentation, peer-reviewed analyses, and contemporaneous reporting to assess both what happened and why it matters for Bangladesh's democratic future.

Keywords: *Bangladesh, quota reform, July uprising, Sheikh Hasina, civil service, human rights, Muhammad Yunus, student protest, freedom fighter's quota*

1. Introduction

On 5 June 2024, the High Court Division of Bangladesh's Supreme Court issued a ruling that would set off a chain of events culminating in the fall of a government, the deaths of hundreds of citizens, and a fundamental reshaping of Bangladesh's political landscape. The court declared that a 2018 government circular abolishing the quota system for civil service recruitment was illegal, thereby reinstating reservations that allocated 30% of government jobs to descendants of freedom fighters who had fought in the 1971 Liberation War. For millions of young Bangladeshis over 400,000 new graduates competing annually for approximately 3,000 civil service positions - this ruling was the proverbial last straw (The Bussiness Standard , 2024).

The quota system had been a source of national controversy for decades. In its pre-2018 form, the system reserved 56% of all Class I and Class II government positions for various designated


categories, leaving only 44% available to candidates on the basis of merit alone. The most controversial one- the freedom-fighter quota- was created to serve as the privilege of war veterans themselves, then it was introduced to their offspring in 1997 and to their grandchildren in 2010. As a result, in 2024, almost fifty years after gaining independence, a person without personal connection to the Liberation War could still enjoy privileges to be offered government jobs due to their lineages (The Guardian , 2024). However, the protests that followed were rather focused not only on the quota itself. The quota issue is only the tip of the iceberg of even greater economic and political dissatisfaction Bangladesh realized significant macro-economic benefits under Prime Minister Hasina, such as becoming a lower-middle-income country, and developing as a powerful garment export industry. Nevertheless, structural flaws in young people employment, the reported cases of examination-question leaks in Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) examination system, widespread corruption and gradual corrosion of democratic institutions, all created a high-pressure environment. The quota decision provided just the spark of these more profound complaints (Gupta, 2025).

This article traces the full arc of the movement: from the historical origins of the quota system in the post-independence reconstruction of 1972, through the reform movements of 2013 and 2018, to the violent suppression and political revolution of July August 2024, and finally to the transitional governance period under Muhammad Yunus and the subsequent general election of February 2026 that returned a new democratic government.

2. Historical Origins of the Bangladesh Quota System

2.1 The Post-Independence Framework (1972–1985)

Bangladesh's quota system for civil service recruitment has its roots in the earliest days of the independent republic. In 1972, through an executive order issued by the Ministry of Cabinet Services under President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, a quota framework was established for the newly formed Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS). Originally, the public posts were distributed based on the following quota: thirty percent reserved to the veterans of the Liberation War (freedom fighters), 10% were given to women victims of the war (birangana), 40% were given to candidates of districts geographically under-represented, and the other twenty percent was awarded based on the competitive merit (Khan & Saad, 2024). The quota system was believed to be a correctional system to address structural imbalances, which existed during the immediate post-independence period. Historical examinations show that the Liberation War inflicted an enormous human price, with an estimated count of 300,000 to 3,000,000 deaths, and that an estimated 400,000 women were sexually mishandled by the Pakistani soldiers and their allies (Bergman, 2011).The quota system was a conscious policy tool in retention of the sacrifice made by combatants, as well as in the acknowledgment of the geographic disparities inherited during the epoch of the Pakistan regime. However, the system was fraught with a certain tension itself, in the sense that there was a trade-off between seeking equity in representation and ensuring efficiency in merit in the context of a government.



The quota distribution was successively recalibrated in subsequent changes to the legislation. The distraction-based reservation was cut in 1976 by twenty percent, instead of the forty percent cut, thus making merit-based admissions rise to forty percent. The revision of 1985 extended the quota of the war-affected women, which previously was not much exploited due to the social stigma around the survivors of rape, to all women and also included a five-percent quota reserve to the indigenous communities, raising the merit share to forty-five percent modestly. The allocation of merit was further decreased to 44% by adding one percent to the persons with disabilities in 2012 (The Daily Star, 2024).

Year	Freedom Fighter Quota	Women Quota	District Quota	Indigenous/Disability	Merit-Based
1972	30%	10% (war-affected)	40%	0%	20%
1976	30%	10% (war-affected)	20%	0%	40%
1985	30%	10% (all	10%	5% (indigenous)	45%


Year	Freedom Fighter Quota	Women Quota	District Quota	Indigenous/Disability	Merit-Based
		women)			
2012	30%	10%	10%	6% (5%+1%)	44%
2018 (post-reform)	Abolished (Class I–II)	Abolished	Abolished	Abolished	100%
2024 (post-SC ruling)	5%	2%	1%	2% (1%+1%)	93%

Table 1: Evolution of the Bangladesh Civil Service Quota System (1972–2024). Sources: (The Daily Star 2024).

2.2 The Expansion of the Freedom Fighter Quota and Growing Controversy

The most controversial change to the quota system was the extension of the freedom-fighter category, which was successful several times. With the veterans of the 1971 Liberation War already in their fifties, the number of eligible people was expanded: children of freedom fighters received the status in 1997 and grandchildren in 2010. This policy, which was the Hasina administration, was highly construed as a political move. Political identity The Awami League is based on stewardship of the Liberation War heritage, thus leading critics to claim that the extension of the quota to third-generation heirs was an instrument to pay off faithful party constituencies not an effort to right historical wrongs.

Quantitative data will offer some insight on the effects of this policy. A review by the Dhaka Tribune (2024a) looked at the Public Service Commission (PSC) results of the 35th to 39th Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) tests. Although 30% of the positions was set aside under the quota of freedom-fighters, the reality of action on this category never went beyond 10.25% in a single exam cycle. An example is that in the 39th BCS, 7.81% of all the recommended candidates were recruited under the freedom-fighter quota, but about 65% of those successful recruited were meritocrats, despite the fact that only 44% of the appointments were officially declared as being based on merit (Dhaka Tribune, 2024a). This over-allocation and underutilization paradox simultaneously became one of the central points in student narratives, with the quota system being discussed as ineffective economically and socially unjust (Mohammad , Emadul , & Ishtiaque , 2025).



BCS Exam	Vacancies	Merit Recommended	Freedom Fighter Quota Used	Freedom Fighter Quota Entitled (30%)
35th BCS	2,000	65%	9.00%	30%
36th BCS	2,200	65%	8.99%	30%
37th BCS	1,800	65%	10.20%	30%
38th BCS	2,100	65%	10.25%	30%
39th BCS	2,600	65%	7.81%	30%

Table 2: Actual vs. Entitled Freedom Fighter Quota Usage in BCS Examinations (35th–39th). Source: (Mohammad , Emadul , & Ishtiaque , 2025)

3. The Reform Movements: 2013 and 2018

The 2024 protests were not a spontaneous event but a third wave of significant student mobilization around the issue of quota that came after two major movements in the past.

The 2013 mobilization, which was focused in the Shahbag area of Dhaka University was small. Candidates that had failed to pass the 34th BCS preliminary test raised some issues concerning the unfairness of quota system. However, the protests failed to gain enough momentum in order to coerce policy adjustment. The government denounced the movement since the quota system was constitutionally preserved and implemented legitimate social equity goals.

The mobilization of 2018 however was quite different in magnitude and effect. A group of students of the public and the private universities in Bangladesh organized the streets in the name of Bangladesh General Students Rights Protection Council (Sadharan Chhatra Odhikar Sangrakkhan Parishad) and demanded the reduction of the quota to 56% to a maximum of 10%. First, the demonstrations began to be suppressed with violence: the activists of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), which is the student organization of the ruling Awami League, attacked the protesters and used tear gas, batons, and water cannons. Over 160 demonstrators were injured in fights at least Dhaka University (Gosh, 2024).

The extreme nature of the 2018 demonstrations finally made Prime Minister Hasina take action. She issued an executive circular on 11th April 2018, decree of the abolition of the quota system in the first and second classes of government posts, which came into effect on 1st July 2020. However, the plan to completely abolish quotas, instead of making the reform proportional, inspired the premises of future judicial proceedings. Although protesters had specifically asked to see reform and not abolition, the radical action by Hasina to abolish all quotas was largely interpreted as a political act of suppressing protest and not involvement in the underlying requisites of the movement.

The legal hurdle gained grounds in 2021 when a group of seven descendants of ex-freedom fighters petitioned a writ in a legal challenge regarding the constitutionality of the 2018 circular. The case was pending until 5th June 2024, when the High Court Division, criticized by critics as showing a pro-Awami League government bias, ruled the 2018 circular to be illegal and reinstated the quota system (Borthakur , 2024). This court ruling was the direct trigger of the 2024 movement.

4. The 2024 Movement: Chronology and Escalation

4.1 Early Protests and State Response (June–July 2024)

Following the decision of the High Court of 5 June 2024, there was an occurrence of demonstrative activities at six university campuses in Bangladesh. By the beginning of July, the movement had grown quite large. The protests returned on 1st July 2024 in all the public universities across the country, but in peaceful forms (Borthakur , 2024) . This was exacerbated on 7th July when a Bangladesh investigative journalist revealed that the BCS examination questions had been compromised over a decade and a half systematically- a discovery that only increased existing suspicion of the fairness of the civil service hiring process.

On 14 July 2024, the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, made a speech at a government event and called protesting students' grandsons of razakars an extremely offensive historical insult implying the involvement of Bangladeshis in the 1971 genocide. The comment attracted a lot of condemnation and was a significant radicalizing mobilizing agent, attracting private university students and the broader civil society into the movement.

On 15 July 2024, peaceful protesters were attacked by the BCL activists with rods, sticks, and in certain cases guns at Dhaka University turning the movement violent. This course of violence was repeated throughout the country, with organized assaults on protestors in several cities. On the next day, 16 July, the first deaths in the movement were reported. In Rangpur, a 25-year-old student of the English language, Abu Sayed, of the Begum Rokeya University, was facing police officers who had moved towards him with weapons drawn in a show of force. Four times police fired rubber bullets at him with the distance of about 15 meters. He succumbed to death before he could get to a medical facility. The footage showing his murder that Amnesty International confirmed circulated on social media and turned into a symbol of the uprising (Amnesty International , 2025).

As of 18 July, 32 individuals were killed. The one day that led to the highest number of deaths was 19 July, when 75 individuals were killed on a day of nationwide violence between protesters, police, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), and BCL. The reaction of the government was the growing repression: on 18 July, mobile internet was blocked as well as the whole country, a total internet blockade was introduced, a shoot-at-sight quarantine was declared, all educational institutions were closed down permanently, and the army was concentrated throughout the country.

4.2 The Anatomy of State Violence

On 16 August 2024, the initial report of the United Nations Human Rights Council and a further detailed fact-finding report of that report, released in February 2025, established the systematized character of violence provided by the state during the demonstrations. The United Nations also stated that most of the deaths and wounds could be ascribed to security forces, such as the Bangladesh Police, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), the army, and the members of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) (United Nations Human Right Council, 2024).

The use of various lethal and non-lethal weapons by security forces was not in compliance with the international human rights law. This repertoire had 12-gauge shotguns with birdshot, 37/38 mm grenade launchers, and, most importantly, live ammunition sprayed directly on demonstrators, non-demonstrators and reporters. According to the United Nations, 78% of deaths occurred as a result of lethal bullet wounds, meaning that the use of live fire was their leading cause of death. It is also registered in the report that no less than four journalists and no less than 32 children were murdered (United Nations Human Right Council, 2024).

Metric	Figure
Total deaths (16 Jul–11 Aug 2024)	650+ (UN preliminary)
Total deaths (full movement)	1,400+ (final estimate)
Deaths in single deadliest day (19 Jul)	75
Total injuries reported	20,000+
Total arrests nationwide	11,000+
Children killed	At least 32
Journalists killed	At least 4
Cases filed (Dhaka alone)	200+ cases; 213,000+ accused
Internet blackout duration	4+ days (mobile); longer for social media
Duration of protest movement	June 2024 – August 2024

Table 3: Source: https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/preliminary-analysis-recent-protests-and-unrest-bangladesh

The instrumentalization of digital infrastructure by the state was another unique and internationally denounced aspect of the crackdown. The Net Blocks internet monitoring organization declared that a four-day mobile internet blockage initiated on 18 July; the availability of Facebook, WhatsApp, Tik Tok, and other social networks and apps were significantly restricted. It was reported that the state governments ordered hospitals not to reveal the information on casualties, confiscated closed-circuit television recordings in impacted areas, and buried some of the victims without identifying them.

Amnesty International called the information blackout reckless and found it incompatible with the duties of the country under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which Bangladesh is a party (Amnesty International , 2024).

The United Nations Human Rights Office described the shut down as a component of a larger repression plan to reduce the organizational ability of the protesters and hinder the international community in monitoring the happenings (United Nations Human Right Council, 2024).

5. The Deeper Crisis: Economic and Political Structural Factors

To understand why a dispute over a civil service quota system could bring down a government that had presided over two decades of economic growth, it is necessary to examine the structural factors that had been accumulating beneath the surface of Bangladesh's apparent stability.

5.1 The Youth Unemployment Crisis

A youth employment crisis was experienced in Bangladesh in 2024 and the level of unemployment among the youth was set at approximately three times the average unemployment rate of the country. On average, every year some 400,000 new university graduates were flowing into a labor market that was providing significantly inadequately few formal sectors job opportunities. Civil service jobs, where the pay is not the only difference, but the employment security is exceptional, the social status is high, the pension benefits, and the contacts of a patronage are valued much more than the objective compensation packages (CIS, 2025).

The Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) test which is considered to be the main entry point to the civil service had hundreds of thousands of applicants only to a few thousand positions. Whenever over 50% of these spots was distributed under reservation plans that favored candidates with certain group affiliations identities that were more associated with political affiliation than actual disadvantage the feeling of injustice was enhanced. To students that came not only of non-Awami League origins but also a system was seen as not only limiting their chances but actively trying to establish a politically connected elite at the cost of meritocratic competition.

5.2 Erosion of Democratic Institutions

The last ten years in the Hasina regime was characterized by a gradual narrowing of pluralist participation in the political arena. The 2014, 2018 and January 2024 parliamentary elections were all boycotted by the principal opposition party Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and the international observers reported severe issues with vote manipulation and suppression. Opposition leaders such as the BNP leader Khaleda Zia were arrested on grounds that their supporters described as political grounds.

The autonomy of judiciary has been questioned. The reinstatement of the quota in the decision of High Court on 5th June 2024 was seen as a politically motivated ruling by most people, with critics pointing to the perceived closeness of the court to the government of Awami League.

Digital rights advocates, journalists and civil society organizations have been subjected to oppression over time. It has been used to prosecute journalists and activists who criticized the

government on social media through the Digital Security Act, which has been replaced by the Cyber Security Act in 2023 (Curtis, 2025)

5.3 Corruption and Question Leaks

It was especially detrimental to the credibility of the government that it took BCS examination questions being leaked in a systematic manner over a dozen years to be revealed. To students who had spent years in training what they viewed as a competition based on merit, the revelation was a confirmation that the whole system of civil service recruitment was undermined. Combined with the fact that the quota system effectively reserved 56% of the jobs to designated populations- many of which were commonly perceived as Awami loyalists- students came to the conclusion that there was no substantive role of merit in the public employment system of Bangladesh.


6. The Supreme Court Ruling and Political Denouement

6.1 The July 21 Supreme Court Verdict

On 21 July 2024, responding to the scale of the protests and under immense public pressure, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling. The court ordered a comprehensive overhaul of the quota reservation system, raising the merit-based share of civil service appointments to 93% of all positions. The freedom fighter quota was reduced from 30% to 5%, with the remaining 2% distributed among ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities, and third-gender candidates. The Ministry of Public Administration published a corresponding gazette notification on 23 July 2024.

However, the Supreme Court verdict came too late to resolve the crisis. By 21 July, the protest movement had fundamentally transformed in character. What had begun as a demand for quota reform had evolved into a demand for political accountability for the killings, and then into an explicit call for the resignation of Sheikh Hasina and her government (Ahmad, 2025). The

Figure 3: Bangladesh Civil Service Quota Distribution After Supreme Court Reform (2024)



Students Against Discrimination organization, which had led the movement, issued a revised nine-point demand that included a public apology from Hasina, the resignation of key ministers, and the dismissal of senior police officials responsible for the violence.

6.2 The Fall of Sheikh Hasina (August 5, 2024)

In the days following the Supreme Court ruling, the protest movement continued to intensify. On 3 August 2024, Students Against Discrimination announced a single-point demand for Hasina's resignation and declared a 'Long March to Dhaka' to be held on 5 August. On 4 August, a further heavy death toll exceeding 90 in a single day was recorded as the government attempted to suppress the march.

On 5 August 2024, as tens of thousands of protesters converged on Dhaka and advanced toward the Prime Minister's official residence (Ganabhaban), the Bangladesh military — under General Waker-Uz-Zaman — declined to deploy against the protesters. At approximately 2:25 PM, Sheikh Hasina resigned from the position of Prime Minister and fled the country in a Bangladesh Air Force C-130 transport aircraft, ultimately arriving in India at Hindan Air Force Station near Delhi, where she was received by India's National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (Hadid, 2024). Hasina had been Prime Minister continuously since 2009 and had dominated Bangladesh's political life for over two decades.

The scenes that followed were extraordinary. Crowds stormed the Ganabhaban and the Banga Bhaban. Statues of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the nation's founding father and Hasina's father, were pulled down. The museum dedicated to his memory was torched. Prisons were breached, releasing thousands of inmates. In the chaotic aftermath, violence targeting the Hindu minority community, Awami League supporters, and other perceived enemies also broke out, drawing international condemnation alongside the broader celebrations of Hasina's departure.

7. The Transitional Period: Muhammad Yunus and Democratic Reconstruction

7.1 Formation of the Interim Government

The concentration of power in the hands of a negotiated candidate, Muhammad Yunus, the economist and social entrepreneur who pioneered microfinance and grameen banking, and awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, arose with the dissolution of parliament on 6 August 2024 and the lack of a constitutionally approved mechanism of the transfer of executive power. At the time of the ongoing events, Yunus, who was then in Paris to participate in the 2024 Olympic Games, was nominated by the Students Against Discrimination to be the head of an interim civilian administration.

On 8 August 2024, Yunus was officially sworn in by the President Mohammed Shahabuddin as the interim government Chief Adviser of Bangladesh in an event that took place at the Bangabhaban. The Bangladesh Appellate Division also affirmed the constitutionality of the

interim government under the so-called doctrine of necessity, given that the resignation of the former Prime Minister Hasina had created a constitutional vacuum, to which there was no formal redress. Those who had been orchestrating the uprising student leaders, such as Nahid Islam, were later on boarded as advisors to the interim government.

7.2 Reform Agenda and International Accountability

The Yunus government committed to a sweeping reform agenda. A Constitutional Reform Commission was established to draft revisions to Bangladesh's constitution, including proposals for term limits for prime ministers, creation of an upper house of parliament, strengthened presidential powers, and enhanced judicial independence. These proposals were consolidated into a document known as the 'July Charter' (Haque & Bisarya , 2025).

On the international accountability front, Bangladesh's courts issued an arrest warrant for Sheikh Hasina in connection with her actions during the quota protests, and the interim government formally requested her extradition from. In November 2025, the interim government's tribunal sentenced Hasina to death after finding her guilty of crimes against humanity committed during the protests - a verdict she publicly condemned as politically motivated. Relations between Bangladesh and India deteriorated significantly as a result, with India continuing to provide Hasina refuge.

The United Nations Human Rights Council published a comprehensive fact-finding report in February 2025, documenting systematic human rights violations including extrajudicial killings, mass arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and sexual and gender-based violence committed against protesters. The report called for international accountability measures and supported Bangladesh's emerging transitional justice processes.

7.3 The 2026 General Election and Democratic Transition

After a long stretch of complicated transition, marked by long-running civil-military strife, sectarian violence against religious minorities and complicated political negotiations, Bangladesh held its first general elections since the uprising on 12 February 2026. The ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) under the exile leadership of Tarique Rahman achieved a massive majority (The Daily Star, 2026). Tarique Rahman was officially sworn into office as Prime Minister on 17 February 2026 together with a new cabinet, thus bringing to an end the Yunus-led interim government. In one of his last speeches to the country, Muhammad Yunus expressed hopes of the democratic practice, the freedom of expression, and the protection of basic rights that had been recently launched.

Date	Key Event
1972	Bangladesh Civil Service quota system established (30% freedom fighters, 10% war-affected women, 40% districts, 20% merit)
1985	Quota extended to all women; indigenous quota introduced (5%); merit rises to 45%
1997/2010	Freedom fighter quota extended to children (1997) then grandchildren (2010)
2012	Disability quota (1%) introduced; merit reduced to 44%
2013	First major quota reform protest movement (Shahbag, Dhaka)
April 2018	Major nationwide protests; PM Hasina announces abolition of quota for Class I–II posts
October 2018	Government circular formally abolishing quota system published
June 5, 2024	High Court reinstates quota system; protests begin at 6 university campuses
July 1, 2024	Nationwide protests resume peacefully across public universities
July 7, 2024	Revelation of 12-year BCS question leak scandal deepens discontent
July 14, 2024	PM Hasina calls protesters 'grandchildren of razakars'; movement radicalizes
July 15, 2024	BCL attacks on peaceful protesters; violence spreads nationally
July 16, 2024	First deaths recorded; Abu Sayed killed in Rangpur by police
July 18, 2024	Internet blackout imposed; curfew declared; army deployed; schools closed

Date	Key Event
July 19, 2024	Deadliest single day: 75 killed
July 21, 2024	Supreme Court reduces quota to 5% (freedom fighters), 93% merit
August 3, 2024	Students Against Discrimination announces 'Long March to Dhaka' for Aug 5
August 5, 2024	Sheikh Hasina resigns and flees to India; protesters enter Ganabhaban
August 6, 2024	Parliament dissolved; military announces interim government formation
August 8, 2024	Muhammad Yunus sworn in as Chief Adviser of interim government
November 2025	Hasina sentenced to death by Bangladesh tribunal for crimes against humanity
February 12, 2026	General election held; BNP wins landslide victory
February 17, 2026	Tarique Rahman sworn in as Prime Minister; Yunus interim government ends

Table 4: Timeline of Key Events in the Bangladesh Quota Reform Movement and Political Transition (1972–2026).

8. Human Rights Dimensions and International Response

The 2024 Bangladesh protests generated one of the most extensively documented instances of state violence against civilian protesters in South Asian history. The international human rights response was correspondingly robust, though its practical impact on the course of events remained limited while Hasina remained in power.

Amnesty International verified evidence of unlawful force within days of the violence commencing, including the use of 12-gauge shotguns loaded with birdshot, 37/38mm grenade launchers, and live ammunition against protesters who posed no apparent threat. The organization’s Deputy Regional Director for South Asia, Babu Ram Pant, characterized the death toll as 'a shocking indictment of the absolute intolerance shown by the Bangladeshi authorities to

protest and dissent'. The United States, Canada, the European Union, and 14 foreign missions collectively urged the government to hold security forces accountable and called for an end to the crackdown.

The UN Human Rights Office's preliminary report of 16 August 2024 noted that the death toll was 'likely an underestimate' due to restrictions on information flow, hospital data suppression, and the confiscation of CCTV footage (BSS, 2024). The February 2025 fact-finding mission confirmed systematic violations including torture, sexual violence, enforced disappearances, and the deliberate targeting of children. UNICEF confirmed that at least 32 children were killed during the protests (UNICEF, 2025).

The CIR's independent investigation, which analyzed user-generated content across social media platforms in both Bengali and English, verified over 50 separate incidents of potential human rights violations, with confirmed casualties in approximately half of those cases (CIS, 2025). Particularly disturbing patterns included the beating of unarmed civilians, the desecration of bodies, and instances of security forces using live ammunition against individuals posing no active threat.

9. Analysis and Assessment

9.1 The Quota as Catalyst, Not Cause

The analytical observation that can best be made in relation to the uprising in Bangladesh in 2024 is that the quota system was not a cause but an event that triggered the uprising. The structural predispositions to mass mobilization, namely high unemployment among the youth, a captured system of recruitment into the civil service, systemic failure in examination through corruption, a narrowed democratic space, and a fifteen-year history of more and more authoritarian rule, had been building up. The June 2024 decision of the High Court gave the immediate stimulus, but the magnitude and vehemence of the reaction bore witness to the cumulative resentments which can be attributed to the quota question alone.

Political interests of the Awami League were technically linked to the freedom-fighter quota in the sense that it could not practically be reformed without an acknowledgement of the partisanship, as The Diplomat (2024) observed. By 2024 the quota of descendants of freedom fighters was no longer a major tool of social justice to a marginalized group; it was also a system of rewarding political obligation and placing Awami League systems in the civil service (The Diplomat , 2024). The gradual inclusion of grandchildren, who were three generations after the Liberation War, had destroyed any viable connection between the quota and its compensatory intent.

9.2 The Role of Student Leadership

A notable feature of the 2024 movement was the level of excellence and unity in its leadership by students. The Students Against Discrimination organization demonstrated a high level of

negotiations tactics and politics. The demands of the movement were carried out in a logical sequence whereby they first demanded quota reform, then demanded the accountability of killings and finally demanded a change of regime in a way that portended to reflect genuine political vision and not the reaction of indignation (Islam, 2024). This would eventually come to be seen with the appointment of movement leaders such as Nahid Islam as advisors to the Yunus interim government and would be the first integration of protest leadership into formal government.

9.3 Implications for Bangladesh's Democratic Future

The decisive win of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in the February 2026 election gave the post-Hasina political regime some degree of democratic credibility; however, the way forward in Bangladesh is still marred by significant difficulties. In case the constitutional amendments suggested in the July Charter were approved by the new parliament, they would represent the most fundamental re-structuring of the government of Bangladesh in the post-1972 constitution since the 1972 constitution (Al Jazeera, 2026). The ongoing prosecution of Awami League party officials, including the death sentence applied to Sheikh Hasina even after death, have the risk of being construed internationally as triumphant justice instead of true accountability which would as well undermine the legitimacy of the democratic transition. The decline in the diplomatic relations between Bangladesh and India which is worsened by the fact that India has consistently been the diplomatic patron to Sheikh Hasina adds up to significant levels of risks to the stability of the region (Chatham House, 2026). Treatment of the Hindu minority group in the state, along with the arrest of religious leaders like Chinmoy Krishna Das has raised eyebrows on whether the new Bangladesh after the uprising is really pluralistic or just a replacement of one form of political oppression with another.

10. Conclusion

The 2024 Bangladesh Quota Reform Movement and the July Uprising it spawned constitutes a watershed event in South Asian political history. It demonstrated that even an apparently stable authoritarian government - one backed by a powerful security apparatus, 15 years of uninterrupted rule, and significant economic achievements could be brought down by a student-led movement animated by a combination of specific policy grievance and broader demands for justice, accountability, and democratic rights.

The quota system which had spawned the movement was finally reorganized to such an extent that it was more inclusive than what was first demanded by the protesting group; the 93 percent merit threshold as required by the Supreme Court meant a more wholesome reform as compared to what the student group had initially requested. But the actual change was a political change and not a bureaucratic one. The movement demonstrated the vulnerability of the Awami League democratic legitimacy, the degree of popular dissatisfaction with fifteen years of increasingly authoritarian rule, and the mobilizing power of student activism where it redefined a particular grievance in the refracting perspective of a systemic malfunction.

The resultant cost, which is more than 1,400 lives lost, more than 20,000 people injured, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, and the prolonged political instability is a disastrous cost. The United Nations has encouraged an elaborate accountability system. The young government of Bangladesh tries to bear the dreams of the July Revolution and the overwhelming task of building truly democratic institutions on the shattered ruins of the old. The future viability of this initiative will depend on the ability of the citizens to learn the lessons of the quota movement, which states that any systems designed to accumulate power, as opposed to ensuring justice, should not be indefinitely condoned.

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